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CASES NOTED
RULE 10b-5 - INSIDER TRANSACTIONS BY BROKERS
At a corporate directors' meeting it was decided to lower the quarterly
dividend. Due to technical delays, this information was not transmitted
to the New York Stock Exchange or the Dow Jones Ticker Service until
approximately one hour after the directors had authorized the release of
the information. However, during a recess of the meeting, and before the
news reached the Exchange, a director telephoned the office of a broker-
dealer firm of which he was a registered representative, and left a message
for a partner in the firm that the dividend had been cut. Thereupon, the
partner put in two sell orders for discretionary accounts for execution on
the Exchange, without waiting for the public disclosure of the dividend
cut. Held: the nondisclosure of a material fact known to one by virtue of
his position, but which is not known to persons with whom he may deal, and
which, if known, would affect their investment judgment, violates the
anti-fraud provisions of the securities acts and the rules promulgated there-
under. Cady, Roberts & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668
(Nov. 8, 1961).1
Section 17(a) 2 of the Securities Act of 1933, section 10(b) 3 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and rule 10b-54 (promulgated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission under the latter act) are intended to
prevent the corporate "insider" from taking unfair advantage of information
he obtains because of his position in connection with the sale of the
corporation's securities.5  These "insider" regulations have traditionally
1. Although the Commission found that both the partner and the partnership had
violated the anti-fraud provisions, it did not punish the firm, and only suspended the partner
for twenty days from the New York Stock Exchange.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1958).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1958).
4. "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or,
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949). (Emphasis added.) For a summary of
the state law in this area see Conant, Duties of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders Who Pur-
chase Shares, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 53 (1960).
5. Conant (supra note 4, at 60) points out that most "insider" cases involve com-'
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been applied to, and the word itself defined in terms of corporate officers,
directors and controlling stockholders." They have been held to give a
seller the right of recovery for his lost profits; a buyer recovery for his
losses;8 and the SEC grounds for prosecution for violation of the various
anti-fraud provisions.9 These provisions have been held not to extend to
fraud perpetrated on one other than a buyer or a seller.10 In some cases,
under sections 16(a) and (b)" of the Exchange Act, the corporation may
recover the profits so derived by the insider.
The instant decision is an unequivocal and intentional expansion of
the scope of rule lOb-5 and the definition of "insider." The Commission
stated:
We have noted that the anti-fraud provisions are phrased in
terms of "any person" and that a special obligation has been tradi-
tionally required of corporate insiders, e.g., officers, directors and
controlling stockholders. These three groups, however, do not
exhaust the classes of persons upon whom there is such an
obligation.12
mon-law fraud, but the Commission makes it clear throughout the instant decision that no
such narrow limitation will be applied.
6. Most of the cases deal with officers or directors. Only one successful 10b-5
action has been brought against controlling stockholders. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99
F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951). See 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1450 (2d ed. 1961).
Rule 1Ob-5 has also been applied to brokers who were knowingly agents of insiders (which
is not the present case). Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., 33 S.E.C. 311 (1952); M. S. Wein
& Co., 24 S.E.C. 5 (1946). As to its possible application to a corporation's employees, see
Loss, op. cit. supra at 1450-51; Note, 42 VA. L. REV. 537, 561 (1956).
7. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). Rule lOb-5
imposes no civil liability, but the courts and the SEC have read it in. See Latty, The
Aggrieved Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares in a Close Corporation Under the S.E.C.
Statutes, 18 LAw & CONTEMP. PROD. 505, 512-13 (1953) and cases cited. See generally
Note, 42 VA. L. REV. 537 (1956).
8. Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d
670 (9th Cir. 1960); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
These cases involved face-to-face transactions; for a discussion of the problems that arise
when the one defrauded bought his shares through an exchange, see note 14 infra and
accompanying text.
9. R. D. Bayly & Co., 19 S.E.C. 773 (1945); Ward La France Truck Corp., 13
S.E.C. 373 (1943). See also Loss, op. cit. supra note 6, at 1455.
10. Birnbaun v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78p(a), (b) (1958). These sections are expressly limited in their
application to officers, directors and 10% stockholders. Blau v. Lehman, 82 Sup. Ct. 451
(1962); Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir, 1952). In the Blau case, a partner
in a brokerage firm, who was also a director of the corporation whose securities he dealt
with, had to pay his "insider" profits to the corporation, but the rest of the firm was not
liable because they had dealt with these securities on the basis' of independent analysis.
Although the existence of this "independent analysis" seemed to be the basis for the deci-
sion, the Court also stated that the specific provisions of §§ 16(a) and (b) (as compared
to the "any person" phrasing of rule lOb-5) preclude the general application of this statute
to anyone who may have had inside information. Blau v. Lehman, supra at 456. On this
difference in wording, see Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange
Act, 66 HARV. L. REV. 385, 397-405 (1953).
12. Cady, Roberts & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668, at 6
(Nov. 8, 1961).
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The respondent (partner) comes within the "any person" phrase because
of his "relationship giving access ...to information" and the "inherent
unfairness" in the transaction. 13
The respondents (both the partner and the firm) contended, on the
basis of Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp.,'4 that rule lOb-5
could not apply because they had no privity with those who bought the
shares. The Commission pointed out that although the Farnsworth case
required privity for a suit by the private party, this action was instituted
by the SEC and "the absence of a remedy by the private litigant because
of lack of privity does not absolve an insider from responsibility for fraudulent
conduct."'
The respondent further argued that this ruling places the broker in
the position of carrying out his fiduciary duty to his client at the risk
of SEC sanctions for the breach of a nonfiduciary duty to an unknown
investor. The Commission answered that the existence of a dilemma, in
which any choice of action will damage someone, does not justify the
choice that happens to be beneficial to the one making the choice. To
the broker who is in doubt as to whether a contemplated transaction is
prohibited by the anti-fraud provisions, the Commission says, "forego the
transaction." 6 Thus, there is no difference between the insider who must
renounce his own gain and one who must give up the gain for his client.17
Although the present decision appears to expand the scope of rule
lOb-5 only in the definition of an "insider," the Commission has taken a
step that may lead to SEC prosecution (and possibly private litigation)
against all those who knowingly deal "unfairly" with inside information.',8
The traditional application of rule lOb-5 only to officers, directors and
controlling stockholders seems to have stemmed mainly from the imprac-
13. Ibid.
14. 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir.
1952). This case held there must be a "semblance of privity" between the defrauded
buyer and the seller, and that privity was lacking when the buyers bought the securities
thirteen and forty-four days after the insider had sold them on the exchange. This case
has been greatly criticized on the ground that the seller knew someone would be defrauded
by his act. See the dissent by Judge Frank in the appellate decision supra at 887; Latty,
supra note 7, at 521; Note, 42 VA. L. REV. 537, 569-72 (1956); 68 HARV. L. REV. 1290-91
(1955); 4 STAN. L. REV. 308 (1952).
15. Cady, Roberts & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668, at 10
(Nov. 8, 1961).
16. Id. at 10. On this dilemma and the problems of disclosure, the open exchange
and conflicting duties, see generally Loss, op. cit. supra note 6, at 1455-56; Leech, Transac-
tions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 725, 769-74 (1956); Comment, 59 YALE
L.J. 1120, 1142-47 (1950); Berle, Publicity of Accounts and Directors' Purchase of Stock,
25 MicH. L. REV. 827, 837 (1927).
17. It should be pointed out that the use of information derived from analysis and
study has not been jeopardized by this decision.
18. Many writers have argued for expansion of the scope of rule 10b-5. See Loss,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 1451; Latty, supra note 7, at 521; Note, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 429,
438-39 (1951); Note, 42 VA. L. REV. 537, 564-77 (1956).
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ticality of enforcing rules with more comprehensive applicability. But this
approach is constricting because it focuses on who an insider is rather than
what he did. Under this former approach, "any person" meant "any insider,"
with a narrow definition of "insider" which limited the scope of rule 10b-5.
In the present case, even though the Commission mentioned the broker's
"special relationship with the company" 19 in its explanation of the "any
person" phrase, there is more emphasis on the "inherent unfairness" of the
transaction and the exploitation of the uninformed investor than in previous
cases. In the words of the Commission, "intimacy demands restraint lest
the uninformed be exploited. 20
Difficulties of enforcement may create an impasse to the expansion
of rule 10b-5 to all who knowingly use inside information, but the greatest
obstacle in the way of more stringent application to brokers seems to be
the business practices of the brokers themselves. One broker has said, "a
broker who never had an iota of inside information would soon find
himself out of business, for the good and sufficient reason that he would
know little more than his customers."'2' He also said that brokers abstain,
not because of the SEC rules, but because so much of this information is
false. This rationalization is no more solace to the insider's victim than
is the hollow echo of caveat emptor. The instant decision rejects these
"morals of the market place" and is a clear indication that the SEC is no
longer satisfied to let brokers regulate themselves in this area.
ALEXANDER C. Ross
DUE PROCESS - REVOCATION OF A DRIVER'S LICENSE
WITHOUT A HEARING UNDER THE FLORIDA FINANCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY ACT
The plaintiff, an uninsured motorist, was involved in an automobile
accident. He failed to comply with the provisions' of the Financial Respon-
sibility Act,2 and the commissioner3 threatened to revoke his driver's license
and registration certificate. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief to restrain
the commissioner and a final decree adjudicating the act as violative of
19. Cady, Roberts & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668, at 6
(Nov. 8, 1961).
20. Ibid.
21. Sibley, Fair Play on Wall Street, New Republic, March 12, 1962, p. 18. See
also Bus. Week, Nov. 14, 1961, p. 29.
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 324.051(2)(e), (f) (1961).
2. FLA. STAT. ch. 324 (1961).
3. The state treasurer, as insurance commissioner, administers the Financial Responsi-
bility Act. FLA. STAT. § 324.021(2) (1961).
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